

GENDER, ARMED CONFLICT AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Background Paper by Cynthia Cockburn

Preface: Gender is visible but mostly unseen.

During the week of April 1999 in which I wrote this paper, two instances of armed violence were gripping the media, at one end and at the other in terms of scale. I am thinking of the micro-conflict that resulted in the massacre of twelve students and a teacher at the Columbine High School in Denver, Colorado, USA, and the macro-conflict in the Balkans in which ethnic aggression against people of Albanian culture from Kosovo/a by the regime in Yugoslavia has elicited a violent bombardment of that country by the forces of NATO.

A nasty killing spree in a suburban school in a rich country that sees itself as a democracy - this may seem at first sight to be neither what is generally considered 'armed conflict', nor 'political violence'. But this depends on how you see conflict and politics. We learned from news reports following the school massacre that Columbine High School was in fact a micro-political world made up of differentiated subcultures in acute conflict, and the young men who carried out the killings did so as members of one of these, inflicting terror on people seen as 'different' from themselves, as 'other'. The subcultures were by no means dissociated from larger cultures and movements within US society. The weapons that were stockpiled in the family garage were produced by the armaments industry that stocked the arsenals of the US Air Force and the Yugoslav government.

Among the pages of analysis of this school massacre, gender was (as I suggest is commonly the case) simultaneously present and absent. The *Newsweek* special report on the theme serves as an example. The paper of course reported that the killers were boys. And clearly this was widely anticipated, indeed taken for granted, because when the police came in and released the surviving students, 'every *male* student had to be frisked and treated as a possible suspect' (*Newsweek* 3 May 1999, p.76, my italics).

On the other hand it is characteristic that when the *Newsweek* special report analysed the likelihood of individuals turning to this kind of violence, it stated that 'having any of the following risk factors doubles *a boy's* chance of becoming a murderer: coming from a family with a history of criminal violence; being abused; belonging to a gang; abusing drugs or alcohol' (p. 82, my italics). The report did not formulate its analysis, as it could have done, in terms of 'the risk factors increasing *an individual's* chance of becoming a murderer'. Had the authors taken this route they would have certainly found themselves obliged to include *being a boy* as a highly significant factor. Being male augments the chances of becoming a killer by several orders of magnitude.

Besides, such a gender analysis would have thrown up not only this sex-differentiating statistic, but more importantly a *relation*. It would have made visible the fact that in the

Columbine school there were at least two masculine cultures in a damaging relationship to each other. There was a hegemonic masculinity embodied in the sporty males (the ‘jocks’), and an inferiorised and alienated masculinity among the despised minority group whom the jocks insultingly dubbed ‘the trenchcoat mafia’. It was this relation that prompted the young men of the alienated group to kill and to die. A gender analysis would therefore have dwelt as much on the dangers inherent in certain masculine cultures as conventional analysis has done on those inherent in access to guns. And it would certainly have noted a connection between the two things.

I suggest that if we were more alert to everyday gender processes like this, expressed in bullying and exclusion, in an infatuation with weapons, and in the way these things are commonly represented (for gender blindness is itself a gender process), we would have better tools for understanding, preventing and ending incomparably more destructive conflagrations such as the second conflict filling the news in April 1999 – the war in the Balkans. We might note how men and women are positioned both in the conflict and in opinion polls concerning the conflict. We might analyse political discourses to see the manly vigour and pride at stake for the leaderships of the NATO countries and Yugoslavia as they balance the advantages of negotiation against those of military attrition. And had we been alert in this way to gender we might have foreseen (something now evident as I finalise the paper in May) that women in Yugoslavia might play a part in a movement to stop the fighting, calling for their sons’ demobilisation.

Analysing gender in relation to conflict and violence

Though the abstract term ‘gender’ is not much used in everyday speech, traditional perceptions of women and men, and of the relation between them, are everywhere inevitably ‘gendered’ perceptions. Though with varied inflections from one culture to another, a difference between men and women is normally emphasised. It is often represented as natural, rooted in biology and confirmed in history. Sex roles and responsibilities are accepted, even idealised, as contrasted and complementary.

Gender blindness is the oddity that needs explaining. It derives from a relatively recent and rather unconventional ideology of ‘sex equality’, whose exponents say ‘it makes no difference whether you are a woman or a man’. A stress on similarity of men and women, and equality between them, is associated with 20th century modernism, liberalism and individualism. It is an important ideal. But deploying the concept often obscures the fact that in practice gender differentiation and male power live on. In the account I have given of the Columbine school massacre, gender traditionalism furnishes the visibility of gender in the story, while liberalism prevents it from being seen as significant or explanatory.

What kind of gender analysis is it, then, that can transcend both conservative assumptions and well-meaning egalitarianism, that is productive of new insights and of changed behaviours? Feminist gender analysis. That is to say one which, like much transformative knowledge, is born of a politicised experience of the subordination and oppression of women as a sex. And today’s women’s movement is as strong as it is precisely because it

unites women whose experience of disadvantage has been in ‘traditional’ societies and in ‘modern’ ones. And of course those kinds of societies are not geographically distinct. Both are found in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas. Nor do they exist in a time sequence. Tradition and modernism are both emergent and in eclipse, depending where and when you look.

We should in fact use the plural here and speak of feminist gender *analyses* of society. Different feminisms have different slants on this. We should also note that men, recognising and acknowledging women’s oppression, can and do usefully develop feminist gender analyses. They are particularly well placed to enhance our understanding of what it is to live in masculine subcultures and masculine power structures.

But there is one constant in a feminist gender analysis, whoever makes it: the differentiation and relative positioning of women and men is seen as an important ordering principle that pervades the system of power and is sometimes its very embodiment. Gender does not necessarily have primacy in this respect. Economic class and ethnic differentiation can also be important relational hierarchies, structuring a regime and shaping its mode of ruling. But these other differentiations are always also gendered, and in turn they help construct what is a man and a woman in any given circumstances. So, while gender is binary, its component parts have varied expressions. We might compare the particular masculinity of the English officer class polished in the Sandhurst Military Academy with that of the unemployed youth press-ganged into a militia in, let’s say, Angola.

The universality of gender systems is perhaps not so very remarkable, given the reproductive di-morphism of human beings – two sexes, complementary coupling. What is noteworthy is that, while formulations of gender show rich diversity from culture to culture, a dominance of men and masculinity is pervasive. A feminist gender analysis has awakened whenever and wherever that reality has dawned. Women have started to ask ‘who differentiates and why?’, and ‘who gains?’. In this way gender differentiation comes to be recognised as a social process. It can be seen going on in the most casual ways (through a coy smile or stiff upper lip), and in the most institutionalised ways (the military academy, the law courts, the religious seminary). Its part in constituting relations of power and powerlessness comes to light.

The metaphor of a gender ‘lens’ is sometimes used to stress that a gender analysis is a matter of seeing (Peterson and Runyan 1993). The viewpoint is most accessible to women who experience oppression, and to others who can empathise with them. The interpretation flows from that. Gender power is seen to shape the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the international arena. It has expression in physique - how women’s and men’s bodies are nourished, trained and deployed, how vulnerable they are to attack, what mobility they have. It has expression in economics - how money, property and other resources are distributed between the sexes. It structures

the social sphere - who has initiative in the community and authority in the family, who is dependent. And of course gender shapes political power, furnishing the sex of political elites, representative assemblies, executives and command centres.

Those distributions suggest statistics. And this is the curious thing about gender. It is, and at the same time it is not, a question of quantifiable distributions of male and female to this position relative to that. Sex distributions are often strikingly skewed, even extreme, but they always reveal exceptions. Militaries may be almost entirely composed of men, but there are always women fighters you can point to.

More important than numbers in a gender analysis is uncovering the differentiation and asymmetry of masculine and feminine as governing principles, as idealised qualities, as practices, as symbols. One thing you can say about militaries is: these are not feminine cultures. And this leads to a further perception. Even in social worlds where one sex prevails, as in most military systems, a gender power system is not lacking. For male dominant systems involve a hierarchy between men, producing different and unequal masculinities, always defined in relation not only to each other but to women (Pateman 1988).

Whether 'equality' with men is a desirable goal (given prevailing gender relations), and how 'different' from men women are or want to be – on these things women are not always in agreement. As with all systems of inequality, some differences between women and men are inevitable, others are unnecessary. An emphasis on difference is more productive of equal outcomes at some times and in some places than others. But since a feminist gender analysis emerges from a political movement, we may legitimately build in a political principle here. It is a principle that can apply to all social differentiations involving a power difference. An assumption of equality and similarity should prevail except when those liable to suffer from differentiation (women in this case) say difference should be taken into account. When should women be treated as 'mothers', as 'dependants', as 'vulnerable'? When on the contrary should they be disinterred from 'the family', from 'womenandchildren' (Enloe 1990) and seen as themselves, women – people even? Ask the women in question. They will know.

A gender analysis then alerts us to the intentionality in differentiation between the sexes. It makes us hesitate to take at face value other distinctions too, like those of biological sex and sexuality. These things come to look less dichotomous, more graduated. And a gender analysis generates demands for change, for the satisfaction of women's needs. But what women, and what needs? Women differ from each other on many dimensions. But this does not invalidate a gender analysis. After all, we do not allow the fact that there are some rich people in poor countries, and that not all the inhabitants of rich countries are rich, to invalidate our perception that some countries are poor while others are rich and that the relations that bind them are exploitative. In the same vein there is no reason why the perception of differences between and among women, and between and among men, should invalidate our perception of a gender hierarchy and gender oppression. Women have multiple and varied experiences and needs. So do men. Women's are less often heard and less often satisfied.

How, then, do conflict and violence look when seen through a gendered lens? They are not, of course, the same thing. Conflict is the pursuit of needs and desires that are in contradiction with each other. Such needs are potentially of many kinds. They may include – the list is endless - material needs such as resources (the contents of a husband's pay packet, a neighbouring nation's water supply), political needs such as a grasp on levers of power, and subjective needs in relation to identity like those experienced by the young killers of Columbine High School.

But conflicts over such matters can be negotiated without recourse to weapons. William E. Connolly has written of 'agonistic democracy'. Through a careful respect for difference, a politicising of ambiguity, democratic struggle can sometimes replace strategies of mutual annihilation (Connolly 1991). At this conference we are concerned with the moments when democratic process fails or is not attempted, where agonistic struggle gives way to fighting and killing.

Caroline Moser, in a recent paper analysing the situation in Colombia, has suggested a three-fold categorisation of violence. Social violence, economic violence and political violence in effect form a continuum, in which social violence (mainly interpersonal) is motivated by the will to get or keep social power and control; economic violence, such as street crime and kidnapping, is motivated by economic gain; and political violence (e.g. guerrilla and paramilitary operations) is inspired by the will to win or hold political power (World Bank 1999). Extending our range to consider actual war within or across state borders it is possible to see these three motives at work again – the social domination implicit in ethnic aggression, for instance; the economic gain that impels seizure of a neighbouring state's land, water or oil resources; or the assertion of political will that is evident in NATO bombardments of Afghanistan, Sudan, or Yugoslavia.

The consciousness from which a feminist gender analysis arises includes an awareness of the violence against women that is endemic in many societies: battering, rape, confinement, 'dowry' burnings, honour killings, genital mutilation. A gender analysis therefore prompts us to think of violence in just this way, as a continuum reaching from the home and urban backstreet to the manoeuvres of the tank column and the sortie of the stealth bomber. Women often say 'War? Don't tell me. My life is a battlefield.' There is something similarly intimate about the rape of a woman's body and the penetration of particularly targeted buildings by laser-guided missiles.

In the remainder of this paper I take a gendered look at four moments in the cycle of peace and war. In each of them gender relations can be seen producing effects through three interrelated things. First, the bodily specificity of males and females; second, their characteristic roles in society; and third the gender ideologies in play. A gender analysis like this throws up (as we have already seen it tends to do) numbers and probabilities due to sex-distributions (more men here, more women there). But always these take on meaning through more abstract, but no less powerful, phenomena at work in each situation (and in my story telling): gendered imagery and representations, gendered ethical imperatives and political possibilities.

Uneasy peace: before the onset of violence

Looking with hindsight at societies that exploded into political violence or armed conflict, it is possible to see predisposing conditions, possibly causal factors, certainly warning signs. We might single out (no space here to be exhaustive), three important pre-conflict phenomena: economic distress; militarisation; and divisive shifts in the way identities are represented.

Economic distress

It was Johan Galtung who introduced the concept of 'structural violence'. He maintained that violence exists whenever the potential development of an individual or group is held back by the conditions of a relationship, and in particular by the uneven distribution of power and resources (Galtung 1975-80). Women, sometimes as individuals, certainly as a sex, suffer structural violence of this kind to a greater or lesser degree in all societies – though that was not his main point.

'Structural violence' usefully alerts us to look at ways strong states and economic actors can achieve their will over weaker countries, classes, groups and individuals without recourse to weapons. And it reminds us that sometimes outbreaks of open violence, inspired by hope, can seem preferable to the stasis of victimhood.

In many societies that have experienced political violence or armed conflict in the 1990s it was possible to see in the 1980s an intensification of structural violence, of inequality between nations and within them. There were adverse changes in the world economy. The abrupt rise in oil prices of the 1970s was followed in the 1980s by recession, falling commodity prices, higher interest rates and increased protectionism in developed countries. Poorer countries were hardest hit. Their indebtedness grew (Ahooja-Patel 1991).

The crisis for many countries was exacerbated by structural adjustment policies imposed by lenders as a condition of further loans. To correct their balance of payments, they were required to produce for export, cut imports, reduce state spending and introduce austerity measures. Many observers have seen the stress induced in societies by forced economic liberalisation and structural adjustment as a cause of subsequent collapse into violence: murderous communalism in India (Chenoy 1998), disintegration of the federal state in Yugoslavia (Woodward 1995), imploding power vacuums in Africa (Turshen 1998:4).

Feminist analysis of these and similar situations has pointed out many gendered phenomena. Depressed wages and high unemployment among male bread-winners destabilises relations in the family. Young men are at risk of being attracted or forced towards crime and militarism. Reductions in welfare spending and loss of subsistence farming hit women especially hard. Female headed families comprise about one-third of rural households, and these rarely have access either to credit or to the labour inputs

required to increase production (Vickers 1991:61). Throughout the world, a pauperisation of women has been noted. It was in the eighties we began to speak of the ‘feminisation of poverty’.

Any increase in inequality (like this widening of the gap between men and women, between classes and nations) weakens the inhibitions against aggression. It legitimates violence towards people considered worth-less, and those who are made to feel of scant value sometimes resort to violence to gain self-respect or power.

Militarisation and arming

In societies that will later know open violence there is often a prior increase in militarisation and the quantity of weapons flowing into the area. (Of course it is arbitrary to confine ‘militarisation’ to an effect of pre-conflict – it escalates in open conflict, and lingers in Post-Conflict situations.) Militarisation supposes a close relation between political and military elites, and sometimes the military are the rulers. Men, and sometimes women, are subject to periods of compulsory military service. The police force grows in size, reach and armed capability. A rhetoric of ‘national security’ and ‘secrecy’, often embodied in censorship laws, limits freedom of expression and movement. A militarised society is essentially undemocratic.

Many women have described the effect of militarisation on Israel, a country whose existence was prompted by one war, came to existence by means of another, and has known conflict ever since. The armed forces are the most important institution in Israeli life. Many privileges, indeed full citizenship rights, depend on having served. Regine Waintrater describes the effect of militarism on family life. ‘One rhythm, the private, is that of their personal, civilian life, with its work, social interaction, friendships and romantic attachments. Permanently superimposed on that rhythm is the other, public rhythm, composed of periods of reserve duty or mobilisation, military exercises or false alerts’ (Waintrater 1993).

Cynthia Enloe notes the gendered decisions that sustain and flow from militarisation. ‘When a community’s politicised sense of its own identity becomes threaded through with pressures for its men to take up arms, for its women to loyally support brothers, husbands, sons and lovers to become soldiers, it needs explaining. How were the pressures mounted? What does militarisation mean for women’s and men’s relationships to each other? What happens when some women resist those pressures?’ (Enloe 1993:250) And, one might add, some men. For militarisation often forces men who do not wish to fight into imprisonment or exile.

Militarisation is accompanied by high expenditure on arms. This is often at the expense of spending on public services, including health and education. In the main, poor countries spend a greater proportion of their national product on arms than rich countries. Daniel Volman has described the arming of the African continent. From his figures it is possible to total at least \$60 billion dollars of sales from the superpowers to African countries between the 1950s and 1980s. That flow dried up, but was followed by an

unquantifiable and unchartable deluge of cheap and recycled weapons. As a result, he says, ‘Africa today is literally awash in arms, particularly guns and other light weaponry of the sort that have much more impact on the security and daily lives of civilians, especially women, than tanks and combat aircraft’ (Volman 1998:150).

Domestic violence often increases as societal tensions grow, and is more common and more lethal when men carry weapons. Sarah Maguire’s research showed that in the build-up to the war in former Yugoslavia, groups providing support to women victims of domestic violence in Belgrade reported that demand for their services increased significantly and violence occurred especially after TV programmes hyping-up ‘national honour’ in preparation for war (Maguire 1998). And Croatian women noted a shift related to increased weaponry. ‘No more wooden sticks, shoes and other ‘classic’ instruments of violence, but guns, bombs etc. Everybody has weapons’ (Boric and Desnica 1996:136). The shadowy, and overwhelmingly masculine, world of arms dealing is often linked to trafficking in drugs and in women. Military and non-military trade becomes entwined in what Georg Elwert has termed ‘markets of violence’, the reproductive system of warlords (Elwert forthcoming 1999).

Divisive shifts in ideology

One warning sign of impending political violence or armed conflict is a shift in discourse, particularly in media representations. Words chosen, tunes sung and images painted, increasingly divide people from each other. They stoke the fires of national patriotism against a rival nation, point a finger at ‘the enemy within’, or deepen the sense of ethnic belonging in opposition to some ‘other’, from whom ‘we’ are different and by whom our culture or our religion, our very existence, are threatened.

This divisive discourse is often accompanied by a renewal of a patriarchal familial ideology, deepening the differentiation of men and women, masculinity and femininity, preparing men to fight and women to support them in doing so. Nira Yuval-Davis has carefully analysed the ways in which the discourse on gender and that on nation tend to intersect and to be constructed by each other (Yuval-Davis 1997). The more primordial the rendering of people and nation, the more are the relations between men and women essentialised. Women are reminded that by biology and by tradition they are the keepers of hearth and home, to nurture and teach children ‘our ways’. Men by physique and tradition are there to protect women and children, and the nation, often also represented as ‘the motherland’. Through this retelling, women are readied to sacrifice their husbands and sons, men to sacrifice their lives.

The disintegration of the federal state of Yugoslavia in the early nineteen-nineties was preceded and accompanied by the re-emergence of just such a gender ideology. Except by feminists, it was not heeded as a warning of war. Many women of the region have since described how the veneer of socialist modernisation was stripped away and gender traditionalism refurbished by Croatian, Serbian and other nationalist movements. Birth rates came to be seen as strategically important. Women were urged to leave paid employment and attend to their ‘natural duties’. Maja Korac has written, ‘the first

instances of control and violation of women's rights during the transition from state socialism to ethnic nationalism were restrictions on their reproductive freedoms' (Korac 1998).

At such pre-conflict moments, an ethic of 'purity' may grip people's minds and legitimate politically cleansing the state of its internal enemies, and ethnically cleansing the land of people seen as alien. It is a dangerous ethic for women. In extreme forms of patriarchy men's honour is seen as depending on women's 'purity' to the degree that women who seek to escape this strict code, or who inadvertently fall or are dragged from it, may be killed by their menfolk with impunity. The prevalence of such 'honour killings' in context of communal strife in India has been vividly described by Urvashi Butalia (1997).

For women, in such circumstances, the threshold of war is lower than for men. But this is just a reminder that there is no clear dividing line in time or place between uneasy peace, repression and war. What name should we give the condition of the East Timorese or Tibetans today, or that of socialists in Chile after 1973?

War and political terror

It is said that in the last hundred years or so, more than a hundred million people have died in wars (Turpin 1998:3). The figure does not include the many who have been murdered by politically repressive regimes, or the victims of the terror sometimes evoked in response to them. It is a drastic increase over earlier centuries: the figure represents about three-quarters of estimated war deaths since 1500 AD. Fifty countries have experienced war in the last two decades (World Bank 1998). Today's practices have ended any distinction there may once have been between combatants and civilians as targets of war. Civilians were half the casualties in World War II; they are 90% in recent wars. Since more men are mobilised, 'civilians' means predominantly women and children (Hauchler and Kennedy 1994). Turpin adds 'These deaths are not randomly distributed throughout the world – most of the wars since the 1960s have taken place in the less-developed countries, particularly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Military intervention, on the other hand, is perpetrated primarily by the former colonial powers, mostly by the United States, followed by Britain and then the USSR/Russia, Belgium, South Africa and India' (Turpin 1998:4).

I will single out (for the sake of brevity) just three, manifestly gendered, elements of war, discussing mobilisation into armed forces; the catastrophic disruption of everyday life; and the brutalisation of the body in war.

Making war

It is men who, overwhelmingly, have been the fighting personnel of national militaries, popular militias, political police forces and the armed gangs of warlords. Men take part in violence for many reasons – for money, for honour, patriotism or brotherhood, in self-defence, for liberation, to liberate others. But male positioning in patriarchal gender

systems and the masculine identities they generate, underwrite all these reasons. Indeed many versions of masculinity in the world's varied cultures are constituted in the practice of fighting: to be a real man is to be ready to fight, and ultimately to kill and to die. That for which men are often asked by their leaders to sacrifice themselves is the safety and honour of women and children. Sometimes patriarchy requires them to kill these very women and children to keep them 'safe'. Urvashi Butalia reports interviews she had with Sikh men in India recalling, sadly but proudly, how during Partition they 'martyred' their own womenfolk to save them from being captured by Moslems and forced into Islam (Butalia 1997).

But representations are one thing, practice sometimes another. As Sara Ruddick puts it, 'In all war, on any side, there are men frightened and running, fighting reluctantly and eager to get home, or even courageously resisting their orders to kill' (Ruddick 1998:218). And armed forces have, and have probably always had, women nurses, provisioners and camp followers. Increasingly, too, women are choosing to enter, or being enlisted into, national armies. In some (in Israel for example) they are kept out of combat roles (Yuval-Davis 1985). In others, by their own demand or, as in Libya, through an official concept of 'modernisation' (Graeff-Wassinck 1994) women do bear arms. The US military 'to offset the end of the male draft and to forestall a reliance on black male volunteers' has greatly increased the proportion of female recruits in recent years. As a direct result, during the Gulf War forty thousand US women were deployed to the Middle East (Enloe 1991).

Women cannot, therefore, claim clean hands in the matter of war. They often support belligerent movements. 'Go, your country needs you!' cried some British women at the start of the First World War. Women are not innocent of atrocities - witness Rwanda (Lentin 1997). And of course they have often participated in uprisings (such as the Palestinian *intifada*) and fought in the liberation armies of national movements. A chilling example today is the entirely female elite battalion of suicide bombers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, fighting for Tamil independence in Sri Lanka, one of whom effected the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. But research suggests that their active engagement in war does not bring women equality with men – even in the case of the female Tigers (Peries 1998). Nor do the character, culture and hierarchy of armed forces become more feminine by women's presence. If they did they would no longer fulfil their current function.

Chaos and destruction

War and terror have the effect, sometimes deliberately achieved, sometimes incidental, of rending apart the fine fabric of everyday life, its interlaced economies, its material systems of care and support, its social networks, the roofs that shelter it. This affects women, who in most societies have a particular responsibility for the daily reproduction of life and community, in ways that are both class and gender specific. The poorest are least able to escape the war zone or buy protection. I will illustrate here with one long and very pertinent quote from a gendered analysis of the 20-year civil conflict that followed Mozambique's independence struggle. The combatants in this war, which resulted in one

million dead and five million displaced, were the presiding government, led by the socialist movement Frelimo, and the counter-revolutionary Renamo, supported by the S.African government.

In this appalling war, thousands of boys, no more than children, were forcibly recruited by both sides. Ruth Jacobson does not diminish the suffering of males. ‘Mozambican women themselves,’ she says, ‘recount numerous instances of the highest self-sacrifice on the part of men seeking to protect their families. Nevertheless women’s stories ‘constantly point to the gendered nature of outcomes as a result of the conflict: for example, the collapse of primary health services obviously affected women differently, leading to appalling rises in maternal and child mortality and morbidity. Gendered mobility was most evident in the differentiation between the male and female population in rural areas (90% of the total population in the early 1980s) where men were more able, with sufficient warning, to flee to provincial towns and the capital. Women, encumbered by dependants, were more likely to have to stay *in situ* producing ‘taxes’ in the form of food and providing domestic services to occupying forces (including those of government). As their workloads escalated, they became exposed to ever higher levels of debilitation.

‘Even where women could get to places of physical security, they were subject to a gender-specific loss, since those who had been largely self-sufficient were dependent on relatives or the available humanitarian agencies. They thus entered into a precarious and dependent position, particularly if widowed, separated or abandoned...

‘The conflict has altered the Mozambican demographic profile, with an overall increase in female-headed households. Moreover, its settlement is now having an effect on urban populations, where men from formerly displaced families have formed second households and may have abandoned wives and families sent back to the rural areas. The underlying gender factor for women in all these effects remains the search not just for a minimal level of economic security but for an acceptable social status, in a society where lone women are far more at risk than their male equivalents’ (Jacobson 1999:180).

Subjection and abuse

Jacobsen notes substantial evidence of large-scale rape and sexual servitude in the war in Mozambique at the hands of Renamo troops and supporters. And it is perhaps in brutality to the body in wars that the most marked sex difference occurs. Men and women often die different deaths and are tortured and abused in different ways, both because of physical differences between the sexes and because of the different meanings culturally ascribed to the male and female body.

Ruth Seifert, assistant professor at the German Federal Army’s Institute for Social Science, has suggested three explanations of the widespread use of rape of women in war.

First is the booty principle. It has always been an unwritten rule of war ‘that violence against women in the conquered territory is conceded to the victor during the immediate post-war period... Normally the orgies of violence toward women last from one to two months after a war and then abate (as in Berlin in 1945 and Nanking in 1937).’ Second, while rape serves to humiliate enemy women, it also ‘carries an additional message: it communicates from man to man, so to speak, that the men around the woman in question are not able to protect “their” women. They are thus wounded in their masculinity and marked as incompetent’ (Seifert 1995:58).

This is a particularly powerful motivation in ethnocidal wars. Women analysing the epidemic of rape in the wars associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia have noted how women’s bodies have been used as ‘ethnic markers’ in nationalist ideology (Meznaric 1994). When men too are raped, sexually humiliated, or their genitalia mutilated, the act is no less gendered: it is their masculinity that enemy men are deriding. The third explanation proposed by Seifert is that rape (particularly gang rape and systematic rape) is permitted to men by officers, and engaged in by the rapists themselves, because it promotes soldierly solidarity through male bonding (Seifert 1995:59).

In warfare, therefore, but also in political terror, the instruments with which the body is abused in order to break the spirit, tend to be gender differentiated, and in the case of women, to be sexualised. Lois Ann Lorentzen studied the writings in which women political prisoners in El Salvador bore witness to their incarceration. They reflect, she says, ‘the specific circumstances of *women* in prison... In these “secret” women’s prisons, captors, guards and torturers were all male. Prisoners were female...’ Sexual degradation, assault and mutilation were the main forms of torture (Lorentzen 1998).

Finally, in some parts of the world slavery is persisting or returning, and war is a primary source of slaves. Tens of thousands of women, mainly Dinkas, seized in the war in southern Sudan have been sold by their captors into sexual servitude (Halim 1998). The Japanese Government have recently acknowledged what was effectively a practise of institutionalised enslavement during World War II in the extensive network of military brothels established throughout the Asian theatre of war for the use of soldiers of the Imperial Army. The estimated 200,000 ‘comfort women’, as they were known, included Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Malaysian, Indonesian and Dutch women (Sancho 1997).

Processes of peace

Individual refusal and cross-community contact

In the midst of bloodshed there are always some people who negate its necessity. If they act it may be in one of several ways. Some (mainly men) may dodge the draft or desert from the military. Some (often women) may shelter and feed people their side has defined as ‘the enemy’. Some may give away sensitive information.

In wars involving inimical communities, as fighting diminishes, the ground is often prepared for cease fire by purposive grassroots work, in which people of goodwill are

keeping open lines of contact and communication. Adam Curle long ago identified 'development' as one of the key components of peace building. He meant the restructuring of conflictual relationships from below 'to create a situation, a society or a community in which individuals are enabled to develop and use to the full their capacities for creativity, service and enjoyment. Unless development in this sense can take place, no settlement will lead to a secure and lasting peace' (Curle 1971:174) This is sometimes thought of as long term peace *building* as opposed to momentary peace making.

There is a war in the United Kingdom, a relic of colonialism, that is largely acted out in Northern Ireland. The violence involves the British state and two political movements, the one (associated with Catholics) an expression of Irish nationalism, the other (associated with Protestants) struggling to retain the union with Britain. Belfast, the principal city of Northern Ireland, is marked by deep territorial segregation and enmity between the two communities. Well ahead of peace moves between the (masculinist) paramilitary forces and the (male dominated) political institutions involved, women were establishing working links across community boundaries. Some nationalist and unionist women for instance co-operated around support of their respective political prisoners. And some women's community centres on both sides of the line found common cause in being working class women from poor neighbourhoods. In stepping across communal boundaries, they were at risk of violence from both their own and the other side (though less at risk than men would have been). In 1990 some women's centres jointly formed the Women's Support Network in which they have since campaigned together for funding, for a voice in political processes and for a fair, inclusive democracy in N.Ireland (Cockburn 1998).

Movements for peace

Depending on the circumstances of the conflict, local counter-action of this kind is sometimes partnered by open protest against violence. Both men and women join anti-war movements, but women are often numerous in them, and sometimes form separate organisations. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, formed in 1915 and still at work worldwide, is a case in point (Rupp 1997).

The reasons for this separatism are several. Sometimes the male leadership style is not prefigurative either of democracy or non-violence. The long-lived women's peace camp at the US missile base at Greenham Common in the UK in the 1980s became women-only partly because it found men provoked police violence (and seldom washed the pans). They went on to develop their own expressive forms of non-violent direct action (Roseneil 1995).

The politics inspiring women's activism for 'peace with justice' or 'against war and militarism' are gender specific but they are not uniform. Some stress women's nurturing role. There have been many expressions of 'mother politics' in peace movements (Ruddick 1989). To stay with the Yugoslav example, at the end of August 1991 as the threat of civil strife loomed large, 40 busloads of parents, mainly mothers, converged on the headquarters of the Yugoslav National Army demanding the discharge of their sons.

Identification as mothers can enlist generous feelings of care and love that powerfully contradict violence. But it skirts dangerously close to patriarchal definitions of women's role, and can be co-opted by nationalisms propagating that very ideology. Some of the Croatian mothers in the Yugoslav movement who had at first called for a mass gathering to 'surround the generals with a Rampart of Love' (Drakulic 1993) were before long perverting their original pacificism into a platform designed to ensure only that their sons did not fight fellow Croats (Bracewell 1996).

'Women in Black' expresses a different ideology. Starting in Israel/Palestine in the late eighties, activism in this mode quickly caught on in Italy, Belgrade, London and other centres. In 1999 it is a worldwide network, currently using local demonstrations combined with Internet links to protest both the Serb nationalist aggression in Kosovo/a and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. WIB groups everywhere are pressing their governments for creative diplomacy, for genuine international peacekeeping and arguing for a voice for democratic NGOs and women's organisations in negotiating a cessation of hostilities. For this strand of the anti-war movement, women are not 'natural peacemakers'. But they have escaped masculine socialisation and so may be freer to formulate a transformative, non-violent vision (Women in Black 1994, 1997).

Knowing what it is to be excluded and inferiorised as women is perhaps what motivates Women in Black to work for an inclusive society, refusing to sever friendships across ethnic barriers even during ethnic war. This will to resist division was wonderfully clear in a conference on *Women and the Politics of Peace* organised by feminists in Zagreb soon after the Dayton Agreement ended the war in Bosnia. The many women of the region who attended, meeting each other again with obvious delight, seemed to have become the pan-Yugoslav women's movement they had never quite managed to be five years before. Citizens now of separate states, they still feel and speak as 'us' in a way that must chagrin nationalist leaders, whose wars were intended precisely to eradicate such a thing (Cockburn 1998, Centre for Women's Studies 1997).

Depending on circumstances, anti-war movements often combine or co-exist with movements for justice, democracy and human rights. Current examples are Sri Lanka (Samuel 1998) and Israel/Palestine (Sharoni 1995). Some of these too are women-only. And again the presence of two discourses, one celebrating women's nurturing role and one challenging male dominance and masculine war cultures, is at times creative, at times divisive.

Whatever their starting point, though, women can clearly see that their substantial work for peace is seldom recognised in a seat at peace making negotiations. When women have dared to intervene at the level of states and alliances, as in the startling alternative diplomacy of the women's NATO Alerts Network in Europe in the late 1980s, they are cold-shouldered (Rose 1995). But in many countries women persist. In 1996 the Afghan Women's Network in Pakistan wrote to the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General responsible for establishing peace in Afghanistan. 'The Network explained their view of peace, as something built up slowly in communities, based on mutual respect, cooperation and human rights.' They explained the importance of including women in

the peace process. The envoy must, they said, add a woman to his team. 'Otherwise he cannot hear the voices of women, because in traditional Afghan communities women cannot meet with strange men,' (Collett 1998:327).

Post-Conflict: the wounds that remains

There is no abrupt cut-off line between war and post-war. Armed conflict is often converted not into agonistic struggle but (as currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina) into non-speak. Sometimes the post-war period is better called *inter-bellum*, a pause before fighting begins again. Survivors are traumatised and the trauma is gendered. Male wounded are doomed to a life of unemployment. Women and children in rural areas are especially vulnerable to losing limbs from uncleared land mines. From nuclear testing in the Pacific islands in the Cold War, women continue to bear infants with birth defects (Ishtar 1997). I will focus here on three aspects of Post-Conflict situations: displacement; economic and social reconstruction; and aid, justice and reconciliation.

Uprooted, scattered and lost

Recent figures published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees show a world population of refugees, including asylum seekers and as-yet-unsettled returners who remain of concern to UNHCR, of over 22 million (UNHCR 1998). Some of these have fled famine, but the great majority were displaced in war. About half are females. But sometimes the statistics of flight are sex-skewed. Among those fleeing Kosovo/a at the time of writing, we are seeing more women in the ramshackle convoys, because young men have either gone to join the Kosovan Liberation Army or have been imprisoned or assassinated.

Life in refugee camps is squalid, dangerous and stultifying. The displaced have to live with the memory of an earlier life lost, and despair of ever recovering it. They pursue the agonising search for missing friends and family. Many suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders – and far too few receive treatment for it, of the kind pioneered by Medica Women's Therapy Centre in Bosnia (Cockburn 1998). In some refugee camps (such as the Palestinian camps bordering Israel) two new generations have been born to the original refugees. Post-war also means deformation of home life for families who are obliged to take in refugees (Nikolic-Ristanovic 1996). Some of those displaced in armed conflict or political terror are obliged to resettle in distant countries, learn new languages and new livelihoods. They have to painfully evolve new identities and new attachments – a negotiated belonging to the host country; to the diaspora; and to a now-distant 'home' (Brah 1996).

As Ann Brazeau remarked, when Senior Co-ordinator for Refugee Women at UNHCR, 'For refugee women all three of the traditional 'durable solutions' – voluntary return home, integration in the country of asylum, and resettlement in a third country – pose unique problems' (Martin 1981:x). For women, mainly responsible not only for themselves but for rearing, controlling and educating children, refugee camps and overcrowded lodgings are specially nightmare-ish. Female bodily processes –

menstruation, gestation, parturition, lactation – become more burdensome, uncomfortable and dangerous. Women and girls are continually at risk of molestation and rape from camp guards and other inmates. Young men and boys risk being recruited into violent gangs, mafiosi and paramilitary forces. Among the displaced who move to big cities, it is boys who are most often seen living rough in the streets. What happens to the girls? Carolyn Nordstrom, researching situations like this, saw boys, and she saw women. But she worried about the invisibility of girls. ‘Outside of families, they disappeared from sight; they had no agency to direct their lives, to talk and trade and set up healing programs, they never spoke on the radio, their words were not recorded in newsprint, political scientists did not quote them, non-governmental organisations did not interview them,’ (Nordstrom 1998). Many girls disappear into domestic sequestration or prostitution.

Reconstruction after violent conflict

After war, infrastructure has to be rebuilt. The environment has to be cleansed of pollution, vegetation re-seeded and livelihoods re-invented. Usually capital is lacking and a country incurs more debt to undertake reconstruction. Another turn of the screw. It may even be subjected by other states to economic sanctions as a punishment for the sins of its leaders. And like destruction, the challenge of reconstruction presents itself differently to women and to men.

Men and women combatants both need retraining for employment, but women may also face ostracism in their community and betrayal by male comrades who expect them to revert to pre-war gender roles. Many women will have become widows and single parents, dependent on their own earning power to keep themselves and their children. In the absence of jobs of the kind they can do, training they can get access to, and lacking capital, credit and land, many women fall deeper into the poverty they knew before war began. Prostitution is often their only hope of a living. A carefully gender-focused World Bank report on El Salvador points out that women have benefited less than men from government land distribution programmes. Women are concentrated in non-regulated lending schemes, get smaller loans and are considered a greater risk (World Bank 1996).

The report also points out that men and women use resources in different ways – wood and water for example. The environment will likely have been damaged or neglected during the years of crisis. El Salvador may not, perhaps, compete in this respect with post-Gulf War Iraq, where there has been massive contamination by radioactive materials, oil and chemicals. But this small country too ‘truly constitutes an environmental disaster... Since World War II, the capitalist export sector, aided by the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development, has pursued a development model that has pushed crops such as coffee for export. In the process, huge tracts of land were destroyed, forests were removed and harmful pesticides were used. In addition, environmental problems were exacerbated by war and militarisation. The military conflicts were battles over land and models of development, clashes between

peasants and the capitalist-export sector. The militaries of both El Salvador and Guatemala followed Vietnam-style “scorched earth” policies where entire regions were deforested and burned, thus hastening environmental decline’ (Turpin 1996:7).

Despite the horrors of tyranny and war, women do sometimes emerge from such times empowered. Take Chad for instance. Until the outbreak of civil war in 1979, Chadian society was patriarchal, recognising only men as breadwinners, property owners, heads of household and decision-makers. The war changed that. Women invented new ways of making money for their families to survive. They started travelling and trading over long distances, developing commercial networks and savings schemes (Women’s Commission of the Human Rights League of Chad 1998:127).

But from all around the world come stories of women losing their hard-won autonomy when the crisis is over. Alya Baffoun has said of the Arab world, ‘women who have massively contributed in the nationalist movements of liberation have been relegated to political back scenes and inferior economic sectors, once the Nation-State has been established’ (Baffoun 1994). The story is repeated in Nicaragua (De Volo 1998), indeed from almost every anti-imperialist struggle (Jayawardena 1986) and many resistance movements.

Consequently, the civil society rebuilt after war or tyranny seldom reflects women’s visions or rewards their energies. The space that momentarily opens up for change is not often used to secure genuine and lasting gender transformations. Effort may put into healing enmity by reshaping ethnic and national relations, but gender and class relations are usually allowed to revert to the *status quo ante*. Old privileges may be in eclipse, but a new business elite, a new criminal underworld, a reformed police force come into being as the familiar masculinist hierarchies. Refurbished systems of morality and authority are re-imposed – by the same old patriarchs. Instead of the skills and confidence forged in some women by the furnace of war being turned to advantage, the old sexual division of labour is reconstituted, in the family, in the labour force. Production picks up again, and women are at the sewing machines. Tourism revives, but now it is sex tourism. Foreign imports again are possible, but it is weapons that are bought not medical equipment.

Aid, justice and reconciliation

As war recedes, war zones often see an influx of international peace keeping forces and humanitarian agencies. They halt the gunfire and feed the starving, but in themselves sometimes represent a problem. UN peacekeeping roles may offer the chance of a less masculine military. Cynthia Enloe tells us that Finland’s new women volunteer soldiers serve in the Finnish contingent on loan to the UN, and Australia’s military has recently deployed its first women soldiers to Cambodia on UN duty. But, she says, we know ‘little about what happens to a male soldier’s sense of masculine licence when he dons the blue helmet or armband of the United Nations peacekeeper’ (Enloe 1993:33, 35). There have been complaints of the abuse of under-age prostitutes, and of rape, against UN personnel.

International humanitarian agencies and NGOs are indispensable in picking up the pieces of war. And women are more visible in their work than in many other spheres of employment. International agencies often operate downwards and outwards through regional and national organisations to local grassroots organisations (GROs) active in development. It has often been pointed out how strong is women's contribution at this level too. 'Over 200,000 GROs exist in Asia, Africa and Latin America, more than half of them organised by women' (Durning 1989, cited in Fisher 1996). But not all agencies have a policy to build local capacity, and some inadvertently create dependencies. Humanitarian aid can create social imbalances, as in Guatemala where uneven distribution of aid has fuelled renewed conflict (Mauricio Valdez, Deputy Director of UNDP, Guatemala, quoted in World Bank 1998b:6). And women often do the work in agencies and NGOs without being involved at decision-making level (Fisher 1996).

Hatred is the strongest survivor of war and of political repression. So processes of retributive justice, of truth speaking and of reconciliation are important for social healing. Crimes committed in war and tyranny, as we have seen, have a gender dimension. And until recently rape has rarely been prosecuted through war tribunals as a violation of women's human rights. Guilt for the enforced prostitution of the 'comfort women' was never acknowledged in the peace treaties signed by Japan after World War II, nor did the US and Allied forces take account of it when assessing reparations (Sancho 1997). It takes special diligence, in any case, to bring rape cases to court in a way that protects women witnesses from further harm.

There is no guarantee that 'truth and reconciliation' processes will not be gender blind. The South African T & R Commission encouraged public debate on its terms of reference. Beth Goldblatt and Sheila Meintjes decided to use that opening to press for a gender analysis. Their submission showed how women's position under *apartheid* meant their suffering often took a form different from that of men. But they did not neglect to stress that women, like men, are divided by race, class and ideology – and 'women who were spies, informers, warders and even torturers were all strands in the complex web of our past' (Goldblatt and Meintjes 1998).

In Post-Conflict moments there is much talk of strengthening civil society and democratic structures. Civil society benefits from widespread grassroots self-organisation, and women are good at that. But their energies are often used without recognition. Participatory democracy means including all voices. But women are seldom there in political decision-making. Niloufar Pourzand points out that neither of the political parties who must make peace in Afghanistan intends to give women the vote. 'So if it comes to peace and to voting women will be out of the process' (personal communication).

Addressing the gendered continuum of violence

As I struggled to impose order on the material in this paper I realised more clearly what the 'continuum' of violence means. Violence, for instance, is sexualised and gendered not just at domestic but right up to international level. Political violence and armed conflict

are not distinct – one spills into the other. Nor is it necessarily helpful to identify discrete moments like ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ conflict. Violence flows through all of them, and peace processes may be present at all moments too. Global processes, what some have called ‘the New World Disorder’, are creating a new and dangerous dynamic in the relationship between strong nations and powerful multinational enterprises and more vulnerable regions and markets. Wars in poor countries may be logical responses to economic marginalisation and political disempowerment (Duffield 1990). In this way episodes of violence at opposite sides of the globe need to be understood as connected.

The continuum therefore runs through the social, the economic and the political. I have tried to show that gender relations penetrate all other relations, including those of economic power, and all institutions from the family to the multinational corporation. For all that, a focus on gender may sometimes seem to highlight the social, the cultural. It may seem to suggest, especially when the conflict in question is fought on the terrain of a non-Western, less-developed country, that the problem lies in the benighted, hate-filled people. It may deflect attention from the responsibility of the national and international actors that bear on those people and shape their world. As OXFAM’s Nick Stockton put it at a World Bank conference last year, ‘By explaining an outbreak of violent conflict as a deficit of social capital, the roots of the problem are conveniently located in the psychological profile of the society in question, thereby absolving the policy of economic liberalization for any share of the blame for the breakdown of the social contract’ (World Bank 1998b).

The international financial institutions are clearly hearing arguments that their policies towards borrowing countries may fuel social disintegration and violence. The IMF worries about the ‘social dimension’ (IMF 1995). The Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department has warned, ‘If undertaken improperly and without special attention to social needs, the adjustment process may exacerbate conflict situations or create new disparities from which new conflict may arise,’ (Synthesis Report on the World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction, cited in World Bank 1998b).

One way the international financial institutions might exacerbate violence is by sustaining or deepening inequalities. Nat Colletta, Manager of the Post-Conflict Unit, says addressing inequity, exclusion and indignity is in itself the best form of conflict prevention (World Bank 1998b:4). In this spirit the Bank has introduced an energetic sex equality and gender-awareness policy (World Bank 1997). And recently its efforts have been directed to hiking this policy out of the ghetto of women’s units and mainstreaming it throughout the Bank’s departments and functions (Moser 1998). The challenge then is in getting these clearly-stated policies operationalised. There is a sad history in many institutions of ‘mainstreaming’ gender meaning ‘forget it’.

If violence is a continuum, understanding it seems to call for an integrated theory. And reducing it requires a coherent strategy linking the World Bank and other funders, the UN and other international agencies, policy makers in lending and borrowing states, and NGOs. Within this, gender strategy too needs consistency. For instance, what has been learned in ‘women and development’ should inform ‘gender and conflict’ policy.

What are the implications of this feminist gender analysis for action to avert war, stop political violence or heal societies after bloodshed? In principle, as we have seen, gender consciousness calls for a sensitivity to ‘difference’. It invites us to see how women and men may be positioned differently, have different experiences, different needs, different strengths and skills; and how in different cultures these differences have different expressions. Secondly, it invites us to notice gender relations – to see how they shape institutions like the family, the military, the state; how they intersect with relations of class and ethnicity; to see how power, oppression and exploitation work in and through them. And not only, of course, to see. It invites us to act for transformative change.

The foregoing analysis has shown some of the gendered features of political violence and armed conflict in their various phases and manifestations. It would be repetitive to convert them one by one into recommendations. But by way of summary...

Implications of this analysis for the World Bank and other international actors

1. In moments of political violence, armed conflict and in accompanying processes of ceasefire and peace:

The different positioning and experience of women and men in (i) militarised formations, (ii) affected civilian populations, and (iii) anti-war and democracy movements, should be noted, and strategies towards them gender-sensitised and gender-differentiated.

2. In moments of relative peace, before and after episodes of repression, insurgency and war:

The different experience and positioning of women and men (i) in family, communal and national structures; (ii) in economic activity and especially economic distress; and (iii) in civil society and political life, should be noted, and strategies towards them gender-sensitised and gender-differentiated.

3. At all times, in relative violence and relative peace:

Gender power relations should be made visible. The gender content of media representations, official and popular symbolism, and forms of action should be de-coded, understood and acted upon.

Strategy should aim to (i) enable greater equality and autonomy for women; (ii) reshape gender identities – especially militarised masculinities; and (iii) find and use a new language, new images and new meanings around gender, of a kind that make change thinkable.

4. Within the World Bank as an organisation policy should aim to:

Ensure the sexes are equally represented in key positions, in the centre and in the field.

Employ a gender lens in all analysis and policy formulation, in such a way that gender is seen as meaning not only women but also men and masculinity, and not only statistical sex distributions but relations of power.

Identify women and women's organisations in war-torn countries, from all ethnic groups and social classes, to engage with and support.

Look for gender-conscious allies within the governments and NGOs with which the Bank deals, and seek to ensure these organisations too adopt a gendered approach.

Take a lead among the institutions and agencies involved in policy on international investment, aid, trade and indebtedness in acknowledging the significance of inequity - between strong and weak economies, wealthy and destitute classes, and between men and women - in perpetuating the continuum of violence.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:

I am very much indebted to Caroline Moser and Fiona Clark and to members of the Women in Conflict Zones Network, who gave me insightful comments on a draft of this paper. I alone am responsible for its remaining deficiencies.

Dr. Cynthia Cockburn
Research Professor
Department of Sociology
City University London
London EC1V 0HB

REFERENCES:

- Addis, Elisabetta et al (eds). 1994. *Women Soldiers: Images and Realities*. New York: St.Martin's Press.
- Ahojja-Patel, Krishna. 1991. 'Introduction' to Jeanne Vickers (ed).
- Baffoun, Alya. 1994. 'Feminism and Muslim fundamentalism: the Tunisian and Algerian cases' in Valentine M. Moghadam (ed).
- Boric, Rada and Desnica, Mica Mladineo. 1996. 'Croatia: Three Years After', in Chris Corrin (ed), *Women in a Violent World*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Bracewell, Wendy. 1996. 'Women, motherhood and contemporary Serbian nationalism', *Women's Studies International Forum*, Vol.19, Nos.1/2:25-33.
- Brah, Avtar. 1996. *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Butalia, Urvashi. 1997. 'A question of silence: Partition, women and the state' in Ronit Lentin (ed) *Gender and Catastrophe*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Centre for Women's Studies. 1997. *Women and the Politics of Peace: Contributions to a Culture of Women's Resistance*. Zagreb.
- Chenoy, Anuradha M. .1998. 'Militarisation, conflict and women in S.Asia' in Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (eds).
- Cockburn, Cynthia. 1998. *The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Collett, Pamela. 1998. 'Afghan women in the peace process' in Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (eds).
- Connolly, William E. .1991. *Identity/difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Curle, Adam. 1971. *Making Peace*. London: Tavistock Publications.
- De Voló, Lorraine Bayard. 1998. 'Drafting motherhood: maternal imagery and organisations in the United States and Nicaragua' in Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (eds).

- Drakulic, Slavenka. 1993. 'Women and the new democracy in the former Yugoslavia', in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller (eds) *Gender Politics and Post-Communism*. London: Routledge.
- Duffield, Mark. 1990. *War and Famine in Africa*. Research Paper No.5. Oxford: Oxfam Publications.
- Durning, Alan B. 1989. 'Action at the grassroots: fighting poverty and environmental decline', *Worldwatch Paper 88*. Washington DC: The Worldwatch Institute.
- Elwert, Georg. Forthcoming 1999. 'Markets of violence', in G.Elwert, S.Feuchtwang and D.Neubert (eds) *The Dynamics of Violence*, Special Issue of *Sociologus*.
- Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. 'Women and children: making feminist sense of the Persian Gulf Crisis', *The Village Voice*, 25 September.
- Enloe, Cynthia. 1991. 'The politics of constructing the American woman soldier' in Elisabetta Addis et al (eds).
- Enloe, Cynthia. 1993. *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- Fisher, Julie. 1996. 'Sustainable development and women: the role of NGOs' in Jennifer Turpin and Lois Ann Lorentzen (eds).
- Galtung, Johan (1975-1980) *Essays in Peace Research*. Vols 1-5. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen.
- Goldblatt, Beth and Meintjes, Sheila. 1998. 'South African women demand the truth' in Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya (eds).
- Graeff-Wassink, Maria ('The militarisation of women and 'feminism' in Libya' in Elisabetta Addis et al (eds).
- Halim, Asma Abdel. 1998. 'Attack with a friendly weapon' in Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya (eds).
- Hauchler, Ingomar and Kennedy, Paul M. .1994. *Global Trends*. New York: Continuum Publishers.
- International Monetary Fund. 1995. *Social Dimensions of the IMF's Policy Dialogue*. Pamphlet Series, No.47. Washington DC. March.
- Ishtar, Zohli. 1997. 'A broken Rainbow: Pacific women and nuclear testing' in R. Lentin (ed).

Jacobson, Ruth. 1999. 'Complicating "complexity": integrating gender into the analysis of the Mozambican conflict', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, No.1: 175-187.

Jayawardena, Kumari. 1986. *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books

Korac, Maja. 1998. *Linking Arms: Women and War in post-Yugoslav States*. Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute.

Lentin, Ronit (ed). 1997. *Gender and Catastrophe*. London and New York: Zed Books.

Lorentzen, Lois Ann. 1998. 'Women's prison resistance: *testimonios* from El Salvador' in Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (eds).

Lorentzen, Lois Ann and Turpin, Jennifer (eds). 1998. *The Women and War Reader*. New York and London: New York University Press.

Maguire, Sarah. 1998. 'Researching "a family affair": domestic violence in former Yugoslavia and Albania', in Caroline Sweetman (ed) *Violence Against Women*. Oxford: Oxfam Publications.

Martin, Susan Forbes. 1991. *Refugee Women*. London: Zed Books.

Meznaric, Silva. 1994. 'Gender as an ethno-marker: rape, war and identity politics in the former Yugoslavia', Valentine M. Moghadam (ed) *Identity, Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Oxford: Westview Press.

Moser, Caroline O.N. et al. 1999. *Mainstreaming Gender and Development in the World Bank: Progress and Recommendations*. World Bank. Washington DC.

Nikolic-Ristanovic, Vesna. 1996. 'War and violence against women' in Jennifer Turpin and Lois Ann Lorentzen (eds).

Nordstrom, Carolyn. 1998. 'Girls behind the (front) lines' in Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (eds).

Pateman, Carole. 1988. *The Sexual Contract*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Peries, Sharmini. 1998. 'Metamorphosis of the Tamil woman in the nationalist war for Eelam', York University, Toronto, Canada, Paper prepared for the Women in Conflict Zones Network Conference, Hendaya, Sri Lanka, December. Unpublished.

Peterson, V.Spike and Runyan, Anne Sisson. 1993. *Global Gender Issues*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Rose, Paula. 1995. 'The NATO Alerts Network' in Georgina Ashworth (ed) *The Diplomacy of the Oppressed*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books.

- Roseneil, Sasha. 1995. *Disarming Patriarchy: Feminism and Political Action at Greenham*. Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Ruddick, Sara. 1990. *Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace*. London: The Women's Press.
- Rupp, Leila.J. 1997. *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Samuel, Kumudini. 1998. 'Women's activism and peace initiatives in Sri Lanka'. Paper prepared for Women in Conflict Zones Network Conference, Hundaya, Sri Lanka, December. Unpublished.
- Sancho, Nelia. 1997. 'The "comfort women" system during World War II: Asian women as targets of mass rape and sexual slavery by Japan' in Ronit Lentin (ed).
- Seifert, Ruth. 1995. War and rape: a preliminary analysis' in Alexandra Stiglmayer (ed) *Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press.
- Sharoni, Simona. 1995. *Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's Resistance*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Turpin, Jennifer and Lorentzen, Lois Ann (eds). 1996. *The Gendered New World Order: Militarism, Development and the Environment*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Turshen, Meredith and Twagiramariya, Clotilde (eds). 1998. *What Women Do in War Time: Gender and Conflict in Africa*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 1998. *Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR: 1997 Statistical Overview*. Geneva. July.
- Vickers, Jeanne. 1991. *Women and the World Economic Crisis*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books.
- Volman, Daniel. 1998. 'The militarisation of Africa' in Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya (eds).
- Waintrater, Regine. 1993. 'Living in a state of siege', in Barbara Swirski and Marilyn P.Safir (eds), *Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel*. New York and London: Athene Series, Teachers College Press.
- Women in Black (1994, 1997) *Women for Peace*. Belgrade: Women in Black.

Women's Commission of the Human Rights League of Chad. 1998. 'Women denounce their treatment in Chad' in Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya (eds). Woodward, Susan L. .1995. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*. Washington: The Brookings Institution.

World Bank. 1996. 'El Salvador: Moving to a gender approach – issues and recommendations', Report No. 14407-ES, Washington DC, June 12.

World Bank. 1997. *At a Turning Point: New Opportunities for Gender Equality in the World Bank Group*. Washington DC. March.

World Bank. 1998a. *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: the Role of the World Bank*. The World Bank. Washington DC.

World Bank. 1998b. *Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects*. Washington DC. August.

World Bank. 1999. *Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital*. Report No. 18652-CO. Washington DC.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1985. 'Front and rear: the sexual division of labour in the Israeli Army', *Feminist Studies*, No.3.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. *Gender and Nation*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications.